VC Classes are Adversarially Robustly Learnable, but Only Improperly Authors: Omar Montasser, Steve Hanneke, Nathan Srebro Review by Anurag Singh, 03743384 August 4, 2021

6 1 Paper summary

<sup>7</sup> The paper aims to investigate the learning of adversarially robust predictor. The claim made by <sup>8</sup> the authors is that for any hypothesis class  $\mathcal{H}$  which has a finite VC dimension, it is robustly <sup>9</sup> PAC - learnable with an improper learning rule. The authors define the requirement of improper <sup>10</sup> learning necessary, as they demonstrate by giving examples of hypothesis classes  $\mathcal{H}$  with finite VC <sup>11</sup> dimension that are not robustly PAC learnable with any proper learning rule.

## 12 1.1 Problem setup and Preliminaries

For an instance space  $\mathcal{X}$  the label space  $\mathcal{Y} = \{\pm 1\}$ . Consider there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{U} : \mathcal{X} \to 2^{\mathcal{X}}$ to protect against. Let  $\mathcal{U}(x) \subseteq \mathcal{X}$  is the set of adversarial examples that can be chosen by the adversary at test time. For example,  $\mathcal{U}(x)$  could be perturbations of distance at most  $\gamma$  w.r.t. some metric  $\rho: \mathcal{U}(x) = \{z \in \mathcal{X} : ||x - z||_{\rho} \leq \gamma\}$ . For a distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  over  $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ , observe m i.i.d. samples  $S \sim \mathcal{D}^m$ , the objective is to learn a predictor  $\hat{h}: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$  having small robust risk defined as,

$$R_{\mathcal{U}}(\hat{h}; \mathcal{D}) := \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}} \left[ \sup_{z \sim \mathcal{U}(x)} \mathbf{1}[\hat{h}(z) \neq y] \right]$$
(1)

The common approach to adversarially robust learning is to pick a hypothesis class  $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  and learn through robust empirical risk minimization:

34

$$\hat{h} \in RERM_{\mathcal{H}}(S) := argmin_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \hat{R}_{\mathcal{U}}(h; S)$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Where  $\hat{R}_{\mathcal{U}}(\hat{h}; S) := \frac{1}{m} \Sigma_{(x,y) \in S} \sup_{z \in \mathcal{U}(x)} \mathbf{1}[\hat{h}(z) \neq y]$  as studied in (7). Given a hypothesis class <sup>24</sup>  $H \subseteq \mathcal{Y}^X$ , goal is to design a learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  such that for any distribution <sup>25</sup>  $\mathcal{D}$  over  $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ , the rule  $\mathcal{A}$  will find a predictor that competes with the best predictor  $h^* \in \mathcal{H}$  in <sup>26</sup> terms of the robust risk using a number of samples that is independent of the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ . The <sup>27</sup> following definitions formalize the notion of robust PAC learning in the realizable and agnostic <sup>28</sup> settings as defined in (2).

Definition 1. Agnostic Robust PAC learning: For any  $\epsilon, \delta \in (0, 1)$ , the sample complexity of agnostic robust PAC learning of  $\mathcal{H}$  with respect to adversary  $\mathcal{U}$ , is defined as the smallest  $m \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$  for which there exists a learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  such that, for every data distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  over  $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ , with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  over  $S \sim \mathcal{D}^m$ ,

$$R_{\mathcal{U}}(\mathcal{A}(S) = \mathcal{D}) \inf_{h \in \mathcal{H}} R_{\mathcal{U}}(h; D) + \epsilon$$
(3)

If no such m exists, sample complexity is infinite. We say that H is robustly PAC learnable in the agnostic setting with respect to adversary U if smallest possible m i.e. sample complexity is finite.

<sup>38</sup> **Definition 2. Realizable Robust PAC Learnability:** For any  $\epsilon, \delta \in (0, 1)$ , the sample com-<sup>39</sup> plexity of realizable robust PAC learning of  $\mathcal{H}$  with respect to adversary  $\mathcal{U}$  is defined as the smallest <sup>40</sup>  $m \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$  for which there exists a learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  such that, for every data <sup>41</sup> distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  over  $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$  where there exists a predictor  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  with zero robust risk,  $R_{\mathcal{U}}(h, \mathcal{D}) = 0$ , <sup>42</sup> with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  over  $S \sim \mathcal{D}^m$  then,  $R_{\mathcal{U}}(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathcal{D}) \leq \epsilon$ . If no such m exists, then <sup>43</sup> sample complexity is infinite. We say that  $\mathcal{H}$  is robustly PAC learnable in the realizable setting <sup>44</sup> with respect to adversary  $\mathcal{U}$  if sample complexity is finite.

<sup>46</sup> **Definition 3. Proper Learnability:**  $\mathcal{H}$  is *properly* robustly PAC learnable (in the agnostic or <sup>47</sup> realizable setting) if it can be learned as in Definitions 1 or 2 using a learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{H}$ <sup>48</sup> that always outputs a predictor in H. Learning using any learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$ , as in <sup>49</sup> the definitions above is improper learning.

## 50 2 Main Proof Ideas

Theorem 1: There exists a hypothesis class  $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  with  $vc(\mathcal{H}) \leq 1$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{U}$  such that  $\mathcal{H}$  is not properly robustly PAC learnable with respect to  $\mathcal{U}$  in the realizable setting.

<sup>53</sup> The proof of above theorem requires two main lemmas in its ideas,

54

Lemma 2: Let  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then, there exists  $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  such that  $vc(\mathcal{H}) \leq 1$  but  $vc(\mathcal{L}^{\mathcal{U}}_{\mathcal{H}}) \geq m$ 

The prove begins by carefully constructing a hypothesis class by choosing  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$  as points which have mutually disjoint perturbation sets, i.e.  $\mathcal{U}(x_i) \cap \mathcal{U}(x_j) = \phi$ . They start by building a set of points Z from which perturbations should not be picked and initialize it to  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$ . Now for each bit string  $b \in \{0, 1\}^m$ ,  $Z_b$  is made of perturbations of  $x_i$  s.t.  $b_i = 1$ . At the end  $Z = Z \cup Z_b$  so that for next bit-string perturbations don't repeat. Then  $h_b : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$  is defined as:

63

$$h_b = \begin{cases} +1 & x \notin Z_b \\ -1 & x \in Z_b \end{cases}$$

We can think of each mapping  $h_b$  as being characterized by a unique signature  $Z_b$  that indicates the points that it labels with -1. The hypothesis class is  $\mathcal{H} = h_b : b \in \{0, 1\}^m$ . Now the proof that  $vc(\mathcal{H}) \leq 1$  follows by taking  $z_1, z_2 \in \mathcal{X}$  and considering cases that both belong to  $\mathcal{X} - Z$ , only one belongs and none of them do. It can be shown that in each of the three cases any classifier will not be able to produce (-1,-1) when none of them are in Z, (-1,+1) if only  $z_2 \in Z$  and either (-1,-1) or (+1,+1) when both  $z_1, z_2 \in Z$ .

For proving  $vc(\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathcal{U}}) \geq m$  one can consider a set  $\{(x_1, +), \ldots, (x_m, +)\}$  and show it can be shattered. Now we if pick any labeling  $y \in \{0, 1\}^m$  by construction of  $\mathcal{H}$  we can find a  $h_b$  made by bit-string b = y. Then, for each  $i \in [m]$ ,  $\sup_{z \in \mathcal{U}(xi)} \mathbf{1}[h_b(z) \neq +1] = b_i = y_i$  and hence the set is shattered.

74

<sup>75</sup> Lemma 3:Let  $m \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then, there exists  $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$  with  $vc(\mathcal{H}) \leq 1$  such that for any proper <sup>76</sup> learning rule  $\mathcal{A} : (\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})^* \to \mathcal{H}$ ,

• A distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  over  $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$  and a predictor  $h^* \in \mathcal{H}$  where  $R_{\mathcal{U}}(h^*; \mathcal{D}) = 0$ .

• With probability at least 1/7 over  $S \sim \mathcal{D}^m$ ,  $R_{\mathcal{U}}(\mathcal{A}(S); \mathcal{D}) > 1/8$ .

This proof follows standard lower bound techniques that use the probabilistic method from Chapter 5 of (1). According to Lemma 2, for  $\{x_1 \dots x_{3m}\}$  construct  $\mathcal{H}_0$ . By construction then  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{H}_0}^{\mathcal{U}}$ can shatter  $C = \{(x_1, +) \dots (x_{3m}, +)\}$  The idea is to construct a family of distributions that are supported on 2m points of C only and keeping only  $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{H}_0$  that has classifiers robustly correct on 2m examples. This would make rule  $\mathcal{A}$  to choose which points it can afford to be not correctly robust on. If rule  $\mathcal{A}$  observes only m points, it can't do anything better than guessing which of the remaining 2m points of C are actually included in the support of the distribution.

For proof for theorem 1 we can construct sequences of subsets of 3m distinct points from  $\mathcal{X}$ as  $X_m$  with no intersection in perturbation sets. We ensure that predictors in  $\mathcal{H}_m$  are non-robust on the points in  $X'_m$  for all  $m' \neq m$  as  $h_b \in \mathcal{H}_m$ ,

$$h_b = \begin{cases} -1 & x \in Z_b \text{ or } x \in X_{m'}, \ m' \neq m \\ +1 & otherwise \end{cases}$$

<sup>91</sup> Then,  $\mathcal{H} = \bigcup_{m=1}^{\inf} \mathcal{H}_m$  and then using lemma 2 we show VC dimension of  $VC(\mathcal{H}) \leq 1$ . Then we <sup>92</sup> can apply lemma 3 over a distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  of  $X_m \times \mathcal{Y}$ . The robust risk for a  $h^* \in \mathcal{H}_m$  is 0. This <sup>93</sup> works because classifiers from classes  $\mathcal{H}_{m'}$   $m' \neq m$  are non robust on  $X_m$ . Thus, rule  $\mathcal{A}$  will do <sup>94</sup> worse if it picks predictors from these classes. Which shows that the sample complexity to learn <sup>95</sup> proper robust PAC learnable  $\mathcal{H}$  is infinite.

96

<sup>97</sup> As opposed to previous theorem that shows that finite VC dimension is not sufficient for robust PAC learning, the rest of theorems discussed after this in the paper try to show that finite VC dimension is sufficient for robust PAC learning both in realizable PAC learning setting and in agnostic PAC learning setting. We do this by providing a bound on their sample complexity in each case. We shall discuss the realizable setting and the agnostic setting follows very similar main ideas.

**Theorem 4:**For any  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{U}, \forall \epsilon, \delta \in (0, 1/2)$ ,

$$\mathcal{M}_{RE}(,\delta,\mathcal{H},\mathcal{H}) = \mathcal{O}\bigg(vc(\mathcal{H})vc^*(\mathcal{H})\frac{1}{\epsilon}log(\frac{vc(\mathcal{H})vc^*(\mathcal{H})}{\epsilon}) + \frac{1}{\epsilon}log(\frac{1}{\delta})\bigg)$$

Where  $vc^*(\mathcal{H})$  is the dual VC dimension. Based on result  $vc^*(\mathcal{H}) < 2^{vc(\mathcal{H})+1}$  (4) Corollary 5 105 immediately follows. The proof makes use of sample compression arguments taking inspiration 106 from work in (3). Modifications made in this proof forces the compression scheme to also have 107 zero empirical robust loss. Fix a deterministic function  $RERM_{\mathcal{H}}$  mapping any labeled data set to a 108 classifier in  $\mathcal{H}$  robustly consistent with the labels in the data set, if a robustly consistent classifier 109 exists. For a training sample set S, which is sampled iid from a robust realizable distribution, 110  $R^{\mathcal{U}}(RERM_{\mathcal{H}}(S);S) = 0$ . Then they inflate the training set S to potentially infinite set  $S_{\mathcal{U}}$ 111 containing all the possible perturbations. Then this set is discretized to denote by  $\hat{S}_{\mathcal{U}} \subset S_{\mathcal{U}}$ 112 which includes exactly one  $(x, y) \in S_{\mathcal{U}}$  for each distinct classification  $\{g_{(x,y)}(h)\}_{h \in \hat{\mathcal{H}}}$  of  $\hat{\mathcal{H}}$  realized 113 by functions  $g_{(x,y)} \in \mathcal{G}$ . Where  $\mathcal{H}$  is set of classifiers selected by robust empirical risk minimization 114 of n sample subset of S. In other words  $\hat{\mathcal{H}} = \{RERM_{\mathcal{H}}(L), L \subseteq S \text{ st. } |L| = n\}$  and  $\mathcal{G}$  is the dual 115 space of set of functions  $g_{(x,y)}$ : mathcal  $H \to \{0,1\}$  defined as  $g_{(x,y)}(h) = 1[h(x) = y]$ , for each 116  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  and each  $(x, y) \in S_{\mathcal{U}}$ . By application of Sauer's lemma we can bound the size of  $|\hat{S}_{\mathcal{U}}|$  by 117  $(e^2m/vc(\mathcal{H}))^{vc(\mathcal{H})vc^*(\mathcal{H})}$  for  $m > 2vc(\mathcal{H})$ . By this construction the majority vote of any subset of 118 classifiers in  $\hat{\mathcal{H}}$  for each point  $(x, y) \in S^{\mathcal{U}}$  is greater than 1/2. In other words,  $\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}[h_t(x) = y] > 1$ 119 1/2. Then same will hold try for each  $(x,y) \in \hat{S}^{\mathcal{U}}$  which means  $\hat{R}_{\mathcal{U}}(Majority(h_1,\ldots,h_T);S) =$ 120 0. Which leaves us with the task of finding such a set of  $h_t$  functions. By the choice of n and 121 construction of  $hatS^{\mathcal{U}}$  we can find for any distribution D over  $hatS^{\mathcal{U}}$ , there exists  $h_D \in \hat{\mathcal{H}}$  with 122

 $\hat{r}(h_D, D) < 1/3$ . Now we can run modified version of  $\alpha$  boost on  $\hat{S}^{\mathcal{U}}$  with  $RERM_{\mathcal{H}}$  as a weak learner i.e. $h_D$  as a weak hypothesis in a boosting algorithm. Using proof in (5), for an appropriate a-priori choice of in the  $\alpha$ -Boost algorithm, and running the algorithm for rounds to give hypotheses  $\hat{h}_1 \hat{h}_T \in \hat{\mathcal{H}}$  s.t.

127

$$\forall (x,y) \in \hat{S}_{\mathcal{U}}; \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}[h_i(x) = y] \ge 5/9$$

Using the above observation we can say for  $\hat{h} = Majority(\hat{h}_1, \ldots, \hat{h}_T)$  satisfies  $\hat{R}_{\mathcal{U}}(\hat{h}, S) = 0$ . And thinking  $\hat{h}$  as a order-dependent reconstruction function we can say following about its compression size, $nT = \mathcal{O}(vc(H)log(|\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{U}}|) = O(vc(\mathcal{H})^2vc(\mathcal{H})log(m/vc(\mathcal{H})))$ . Using Lemma 11 and taking care of condition on m we can rewrite above as, with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ ,

$$RU(h^{i}P) \leq \mathcal{O}(vc(\mathcal{H})^{2}vc^{*}(\mathcal{H})\frac{1}{m}log\left(\frac{m}{vc(\mathcal{H})}\right)log(m) + \frac{1}{m}log(1/\delta))$$

<sup>133</sup> With further application of technique from (6) the bound can be further reduced.

## 134 3 Review

<sup>135</sup> **Novelty:** This paper provides two theoretical analyses of generalization for robust PAC learning. <sup>136</sup> The results are very significant in my knowledge since they try to understand the generalization for <sup>137</sup> adversarially robust learning objective which has wide applications (7). More precisely the contri-<sup>138</sup> butions of the paper are that the authors show that there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{U}$  and a hypothesis <sup>139</sup> class  $\mathcal{H}$  with finite VC dimension that cannot be robustly PAC learned with any proper learning <sup>140</sup> rule (including RERM). They also show that for any VC class  $\mathcal{H}$  and any adversary  $\mathcal{U}$ , using an <sup>141</sup> improper learning rule,  $\mathcal{H}$  is agnostically robustly PAC learnable.

142

**Significance:** Their results indicate that are for some hypothesis classes there are large gaps 143 between what can be done with proper vs. improper PAC learning rules. This means that when 144 studying a particular class, such as classes corresponding to neural networks, one should consider 145 the possibility that there might be such a gap and that improper learning might be necessary. 146 However, it is still an open question to study and establish if such gaps actually exist for specific 147 interesting neural net classes (e.g., functions represented by a specific architecture, like resnet). 148 Assuming that such gaps exist, one of the main takeaways of the paper is that for the task of 149 adversarially robust learning, improper pac learning rules should be considered it would be inter-150 esting to see how improper pac learning is incorporated in neural network training/optimization 151 framework. 152

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<sup>154</sup> Clarity: The paper is technically sound and well written with proofs mostly easy to follow. <sup>155</sup> There are some parts where proves could be more elaborate in the Lemmas, some comments on <sup>156</sup> them are made in minor comments.

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**Comments:** The paper assumes certain aspects about the adversarial robust learning frame-158 work, that the  $\mathcal{U}$  must be in the same instance space, which may not be the case for all attacks(8). 159 Also, it may not be necessary that the perturbations do exist for all the inputs in the set with 160 distance  $\gamma$  and it can be empty or possibly finite, which would mean that construction of such 161 special hypothesis classes for proves would not be possible. As for some minor comments, I believe 162 there few statements in the proof of Lemma 3 are hard to follow, particularly how being robustly 163 correct on 2m examples leads to given set expression of  $\mathcal{H}$  i.e. the following statement, We will 164 only keep a subset  $\mathcal{H}$  of  $\mathcal{H}_0$  that includes classifiers that are robustly correct only on subsets of size 165  $2m, i.e. \mathcal{H} = \{h_b \in \mathcal{H}_0 : \sum_{i=1}^{3m} b_i = m\}.$ 166

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